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Introduction: Understanding the Governance Problems of the South China Sea
This paper will look at the South China Sea from several perspectives. We will, however, not adopt the political science perspective on various events that have happened due to political tensions because of territorial demarcations, fishing rights and access to natural resources (Harada 2013) . This perspective reflects the current discourse, found in most of the 16.200 books and papers touching on conflicts in the South China Sea (Google Scholar 1970 . Another approach will take a broad comparative historical view, comparing "mediterranean seas". I shall argue that mediterranean seas share certain properties as they develop into integrated socio-cultural areas. The third perspective uses macro-sociology and cultural anthropology to classify and understand actions of the general population as well as political leaders when they ascertain property rights to mediterranean seas (Evers 2014) .
"Since the end of the Second World War, the ocean has become a source of instability in the international system" (Yee 2011:166) . Mediterranean seas, however, have been highly contested throughout history. The South China Sea has increasingly attracted the attention of politicians, journalists and scholars, when several clashes took place in the South China Seas. While in 1999 noted British political scientist Michael Leifer could still publish a book chapter about a "stalemate in the South China Sea" (Leifer 1999:1-9) , the tension has accelerated shortly thereafter, leading to armed conflict. The basic outline of the South China Sea conflict has been well described in many publications. The situation can be described as follows.
The South China Sea is a "mediterranean sea", surrounded by land belonging to different states: the ASEAN states (except Burma), Taiwan and China. Each (except Singapore) claim part of the South China Sea as their territory. Territorial claims are based on the law of the sea, which differs from land based property rights. Traditionally the sea was open to all nations and their ships except for a three mile zone ("as far as a canon ball could fly"), regarded as part of the national territory with all rights attached. This zone was extended to 12 miles and later on a 200 mile exclusive economic zone was added and accepted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1977 (ratified and signed by all ASEAN states and China, but not by the USA). This zone gave exclusive rights for fishing and the exploitation of underwater resources, especially oil and gas, to a nation state. This regulation provides no major problems to oceans and their bordering states, but proves to be very tricky to mediterranean seas. There are overlapping claims, especially when islands are involved. Zones can be drawn around islands, if they are inhabited and equidistance is used as a principle to delineate boundaries. Article 121, paragraph 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) clearly states that "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf" (Quang 2010) . Erecting physical structures and placing military personal on barren rocks has become a tool to turn rocks into inhabited islands with a claim to suzerainty.
UNCLOS also allows the use of historical evidence to stake a claim to areas where equidistance lines or islands are difficult to delineate (Article 15). 21137144 12-02-2013 Attempts to govern the South China Sea have, indeed, produced a very complex system of claims, counterclaims, diffuse boundary mapping, negotiations, public protests and press coverage.
To understand the underlying issues of problem solving we intend to step back and look at the underlying cultural and geographical patterns. In this we intend to follow the methods of the "Verstehende Soziologie" of Max Weber and the "Longue Durée" of history according to the historical methods of the Annales School of French historian Fernand Braudel and his followers (Braudel 1958; Braudel 1966; Braudel 1972 ).
Max Weber's "Verstehende Soziologie", often not quite correctly translated as "interpretative sociology" assumes that we need to understand the intentions, the underlying motives, the "subjektiv gemeinter Sinn" of actors but also the contexts in which actions take place to make sense of history, to understand, what happens. Braudel suggested that actors, including great historical figures, are often acted upon by the long flow of history, the physical realm, by spatial opportunities and constraints. In this paper I shall abandon "event-history" (l'histoire evénémentielle as criticized by Fernand (Braudel 1958) ). After his work on the Mediterranean, "Braudel became more and more attracted to the idea of quantification in economic history, the notion that history could become scientifically respectable through the use of graphs and tables and the collection of hard quantifiable data" (introduction by Oswyn Murray) (Braudel 1972) . Long time series of data would reveal the long durée of history, if they are interpreted and used to explain historical trends. I will, later in this paper, follow Braudel's advice and present some data on connections and networks of the South China Sea.
Another look at the classics of world history and cultural analysis adds credence to this approach. Oswald Spengler, author of the monumental work on the "Untergang des Abendlandes" (Spengler 1923 (Spengler , 1998 , English "The Decline of the West" (Spengler 1932) In this paper we will look at the long term cultural conceptions of maritime space as well as the physical space itself. In short we follow the often cited "spatial turn" that reintroduced space into social science research (Mishkova 2010) . The "social construction of space" (Steinberg 2001) , in this case maritime space, is determined both by cultural values and by the need and desire to exploit maritime resources. The "spatiality of the capitalist economy" has reached the "free" oceans and has become even more relevant to the maritime space of the mediterranean seas. The disputes over the South China Sea signify one major flashpoint of this process.
Mediterranean Seas
The South China Sea is one of many "mediterranean seas". In contrast to oceans, mediterranean seas (from Latin media-middle and terra-land) are surrounded by land, with narrow outlets to oceans or other seas. The Baltic, the Mediterranean Sea, but also the South China Sea may all be classified as "mediterranean seas". Southeast Asia is particularly rich in mediterranean seas. The Sulu Sea, the Celebes Sea, the Banda Sea, the Arafura Sea, the Java Sea, the Andaman Sea and last not least the South China Sea are well defined mediterranean seas, bordered by maritime ASEAN states. By throwing a glance on other mediterranean seas we may be able to put the issues surrounding the South China Sea into a better perspective.
This view is hotly contested by some historians. In his earlier writings Wang Gungwu argued that the South China Sea (called Nanhai 南海) could not really be compared to other mediterranean seas, as it was dominated by one great power, namely imperial China, whereas other mediterranean seas had several contesting powers (Wang 2008) . He changed his in my view untenable view later and gave credence to changing conditions and the at times dominating position of Sri Vijaya, Majapahit, Brunei or Ayuthia. He then used the term "semiterranean sea" to describe the special features of the South China Sea (Wang 2012) .
Mediterranean seas often appear to exhibit a basic physical cum geo-political structure. The Mediterranean Sea and the South China Sea measure both about 3400 km at their longest distance from shore to shore; the Baltic Sea about 1000 km. All three seas are surrounded by maritime states ("thalassic states" from Greek thalassa-sea), island states ("archipelagic states"
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The ancient archipelactic Greeks battled the Persian terranian state. The Greeks could have conquered the whole Mediterranean, turning it into a Greek lake. Instead Alexander turned East. He defeated the Persian Empire, cutting it off the Mediterranean Sea, but his empire crumbled soon after his death in 323. During the second centenium BC the bitter conflict between Rome and Carthage raged for almost 200 years. Poet and Senator Cato (234-149 BC) closed his speeches in the Roman Senate, whatever their topic was, with the famous sentence "ceteris censeo Carthaginem esse delendam" (I further conclude that Cartage has to be destroyed). Hannibal of Carthage, "maritime state", followed a "terranian" policy and tried to conquer Rome by taking the overland route through Gaull (Southern France) and across the Alps. The Carthagians failed, and Rome, also a "maritime state", counter-attacked across the sea using its navy, destroying Carthage and razing the capital city to the ground. Rome remained the dominant power in the Mediterranean Sea for centuries to come.
) and land-based states ("terranian states" from Latin terra). By looking at the "longue durée" of the well-researched history of the Mediterranean Sea we may discover some interesting parallels to the less well known South China Sea and the behaviour of the three types of states.
To jump closer to the present: eventually an outside power made an inroad, when on 11th April 1713 Gibraltar was ceded to Great Britain, which subsequently took over Malta in 1800 and thus controlled the sea lanes through the Mediterranean, since 1869 after the opening of the Suez Canal all the way to Asia, but at the same time destabilising the whole Mediterranean region.
The door is open for speculation. Is Peking and Tokyo the equivalence to Rome and Carthage? Is Singapore the Venice of the South China Sea? Will the US Empire, controlling the Pacific Ocean, also try to govern the mediterranean South China Sea, or will China take over this role? Is Penang the Malta of the East? A much more detailed research would be necessary to answer these queries and before a comparative picture would emerge.
All Mediterranean seas experienced periods of intensive trade relations, exchange of knowledge, economic prosperity and the flowering of science, religion and innovation. A common Mediterranean culture emerged around the Mediterranean Sea, centred at times on Athens, Alexandria, Rome and much later Venice. The same cultural integration took place around the Java Sea and later the Straits of Malacca, known at times as the "Sea of Melayu" (Andaya 2000) 3 .This "Austronesian" and later "Nusantara culture" extended to the shores of the South China Sea. It never encompassed all the areas surrounding the South China Sea, which never developed into a cultural mediterranean. Despite extensive trade, naval expeditions, like those of Srivijaya or much later the Bruneian thalassocratie (de Vivienne 2012) in the 16th century, or the Japanese Greater Prosperity Sphere, despite migration and religious missions, the South China Sea remained unified only in name, but never became a culturally unified region. The Thais, the Vietnamese and Chinese looked inward to their vast hinterland, and the highly fragmented Nusantara concentrated on their own Mediterranean seas, like the Sulu, Sulawesi and Java seas and the Straits of Malacca. With Western colonial expansion the South China Sea became an important shipping lane of European-Asian trade and some of the islands were envisaged as coaling stations for cargo ships, but the "South China Sea" remained a sea south of China and might as well have been called the North Brunei Sea, the Eastern Sea (Bien Đong in Vietnamese) or the Philippine Atlantic. The South China Sea has been an important shipping lane for the past 2000 years. Its rich fish resources have provided livelihood for the surrounding countries for centuries. But since World War II the discovery of huge oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea "is producing a new geography of conflict in which resource flows rather than political divisions constitute the major fault lines" (Yee 2011) . The positions of the governments of surrounding states have hardened, negotiations have largely failed and a solution is not in sight. Why has it not been possible to come to agreements as has been the case in the Baltic or Mediterranean Seas? Deep-seated cultural perceptions and values may be at stake, in addition to the lure of vast "treasures" of maritime resources. This hypothesis is pursued further in the following section. Land-based space knows bounded territories, landscapes, fixed natural or political boundaries. Space is structured by places and place names, small patterned named areas like valleys and mountains, rivers, settlements, roads, geodetic points etc etc.
Conceptions of Space
Of course these generalized conceptions of maritime and land-based space are subject to variations. Cultural values and concepts are intertwined with these generalized concepts and yield a more varied epistemology of space. In fact one may surmise that the "generalized conceptions of maritime space" as underlying the current international law of the sea as promulgated by UNCLOS may be very much determined more by European culture than anything else.
Since the economic potential of oceans and the sea beyond fisheries and transport became evident, a movement towards "sea enclosure" has in fact started. Will the sea be exposed to "the tragedy of a transnational commons"?
The states, surrounding mediterranean seas can be classified according to their maritime potential.
States with a long coastline, deep rivers, natural harbours and long beaches have a natural potential to engage in maritime economic activities (Evers and Karim 2011) . Michael Pearson has used the term "littoral societies" for the coastal population of these "maritime states". He makes the case "that we can go around the shores of an ocean or a sea, or indeed the whole world, and identify societies that have more in common with other littoral societies than they do with their inland neighbours" (Pearson 2006:353) . A maritime state will have littoral as well as inland societies. This may cause tensions and pull the state into either a maritime or terrestrial direction; not necessarily in day-to-day politics but rather in the "longue durée" of history.
Other states with a large landmass at their deposal may envisage the sea less attractive. A special case will be island states or states consisting primarily of islands of different shape and size. Mediterranean areas tend to show a similar physical structure. There are bordering states with a small coastline relative to their landmass, others will be prone to engage in maritime activities due to their high maritime potential, whereas there is, at least in the three Mediterranean seas under consideration, at least one state spanning the islands of an archipelago. We therefore propose to classify mediterranean states into three categories:
• Archipelagic states (e.g. Indonesia, the Philippines, Maldives),
• Thalassic states (UK, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam),
• Terranian (land-based, continental) states (China, Russia, Laos).
For the purposes of UNCLOS, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: As Fernand Braudel has suggested the geographical physical conditions of a Mediterranean area will have an impact on the flow of history (Braudel 1972) . We have followed his advice and looked at coastlines and landmass as a clue to the maritime potential of nations. Equally important appears to be the cultural dimension of the flow of history, of the "longue durée". Cultural anthropologists will agree that cultural values are generally more difficult to change than political boundaries or economic systems. I will therefore look at conceptions of space as a cultural trait of great permanence. Given the high degree of ethnic diversity in the South China Sea region, this appears to be an almost impossible task. I will nevertheless try to draw some general lines that may at least produce propositions to guide research on the predicaments of the South China Sea.
(c) Malay Conceptions of Space
The countries surrounding the South China Sea can be divided into three cultural areas: China, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam share many cultural characteristics, as do Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines. Thailand forms a distinctly different cultural area. The distinctions are not clear-cut, as all these countries have a multi-ethnic population, but there tend to be politically dominant ethnic groups that have determined long-term political processes.
Concentrating on two big blocks, the Nusantara (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines) and the Sinic block (China, Taiwan, Singapore and perhaps Thailand) we will try to distinguish between their respective cultural conceptions of space. The cultural interpretation of maritime space will thus be defined as part of the Longue Durée of history (Braudel) . Through this methodology we hope to enhance our understanding (in the sense of Max Weber's interpretative sociology) of current debates on the South China Sea by searching for basic cultural concepts and constructions (arch types according to Spengler).
Malay and Chinese conceptions of space appear to differ considerably as outlined in an earlier empirical study (Evers 1977) . Chinese space shows clearly defined boundaries (Evers 2013) . Village houses in Southern China are arranged in a row; ancient cities are enclosed by a wall and tend to conform to an ideal pattern, as described in Paul Wheatley's "pivot of the four quarters" (Wheatley 1971) . In contrast Malay kampungs consist of scattered houses, built on land or water without clearly demarcated boundaries. Graves on Chinese graveyards are structures arranged in rows facing the same direction as demanded by geomancy, the "science" of location and direction. Graves in Malay graveyards, except perhaps for the nobility, are scattered and arranged without any clearly visible pattern. There is no conception of urban space. In Malay language, modern urban areas are designated as "port" (Bandar), "fort" (kota) or market place (pecan). There is no original word to designate a "city". Power emanates from the Sultan's palace that may have been fortified by a stockade or wall, but the rakyat lives traditionally in kampongs scattered around the istana. The Javanese principalities of Yogyakarta and Solo may serve as an example. There was no clear-cut boundary, delineating the realm of each sultanate. Villages showing allegiance for either of the two sultans may be located next to each other, resulting in a chequered pattern of different authority, rather than bounded space. The mandala principle of governance points into the same direction. Power is ritually and actually concentrated in the person of the sultan and his istana, surrounded by the mancanegara, the directly ruled area where the royal retainers live, defined by their duties as warriors or servants for palace duties rather than as urban citizens. The realm of sultanates becomes diluted the further away from the ritual centre of the state (often described as the paku alam) an area might be, resulting in fussy border areas with overlapping suzerainty. One of the scarce Javanese maps depicts the islands of Java and Sumatra as a clock, where both islands rotate about a centre marked as Krakatau. This island between Sumatra and Java erupted as a fiery volcano and thus marked, in Javanese mythology, the centre of the world.
The outlay of today's Bandar Seri Begawan and its surrounding area, the Muara District follows very much the Malay conception of space. Sultan Omar Mosque, the Sultan's palace, a parade ground and some banks and the Gadong Mall are a sort of city centre, but the rest of Brunei's urban area has no clear structure, assembling neither a colonial nor a Chinese grid structure. Shopping centres, housing blocks, modern kampungs, a national university and some hotels are scattered over the whole district, connected by large four lane highways. Urban Brunei appears to consist of largely unplanned urban kampongs, surrounding the royal complex of istana and masjid. The emphasis on a centre as the seat of vitality and power appears to be a key Austronesian concept (Waterson 1993:230) , found in many Southeast Asian societies. Power radiates from the centre and is diminished with distance. Barbara Andaya's paper on Malay sounds and authority points to the same direction (Andaya 2011) . The sound of the drum (nobat) emanating from a centre, the Sultan's istana, is heard at a distance and then slowly disappears further away from its origin. Authority and power is strong at the centre but peters out at the fringes. No clear boundary is marked by the sound of the Malay drum of authority, which fades away in the distance.
In this context it is interesting to note that no maps are found in classical Malay manuscripts, whereas "many guides and descriptions of sea routes existed in China" (Schottenhammer 2012; Schottenhammer and Ptak 2009 ). Malay seascapes are described rather vaguely by referring to places, rocks and promontories (tanjung), but no pre-modern Malay sea charts have ever been found. Even Bugis maps, described by LeRoux and Sense (Le Roux and Cense 1935) and by Amarell (Amarell 1999) are probably copies of Dutch maps rather than original Bugis works. Some notes on maps are found here and there, but none of these maps have ever surfaced (Ferrand 1918; Gelpke 1995; Holle 1877) . Lombard refers to some maps, but has to admit that none of them could be traced (Lombard 2012) . Apparently Nusantara conceptions of space do not lend themselves for drawing Euclidian space and maps 4 Denis Lombard has provided a good overview of Javanese concepts of time and space (Lombard 1986) , however, "a cultural history of Indonesian imaginings of the sea is yet to be written" (Cribb and Ford 2009).
, though there may be differences between Malay, Bugis and Javanese concepts.
All this was, of course, changed and regulated by the respective colonial administrations, following their Western concepts of clear boundaries, but the original conceptions of space still linger on as cultural traits and way of thinking (as we discovered, doing field research on patterns of landownership in Malaysia and Indonesia) (Evers 1975a; Evers 1975b; Lee and Evers 1978) .
Another related aspect of the Malay conception of space is its focus on water. Nusantara designates the maritime space between the islands, hulu and hilir (up-stream and downstream) are important Malay geographical concepts. Chinese thinking, however, appears to be land based and their relationship to the sea was ambivalent. "The ancient Chinese always had a complex psychic relation to the vast ocean: longing, but disdaining" (Sun 2010 ). The traditional Chinese coastal defence concept of "alongshore defence" was changed by Deng Hsiao Ping in the 1970ies/80ies to the strategic concept of "offshore defence", which differed from China's traditional passive defence idea of defending land territory (Sun 2010:334) .
"But for Malays and many other sea and riverine peoples, the focus was on water, not land, and entities were formed by seas and rivers joined by short land passages" (Andaya 2000) . The classic Malay states around the island of Borneo had their capital at the estuary of a major river, or as in the case of Brunei Darussalam or Pontianak on a water village (kampung air) right in a river (King 1994) . Their wealth derived from trade with upriver forest products and the trading networks across the sea to other principalities, kingdoms, or sultanates (Hall 1985) . Power was concentrated in the istana and vanished upriver or farther away across the sea.
The Nusantara concentric mandala conception of space differs from the Chinese conceptions of bounded space. Fuzzy boundaries versus clearly defined boundaries, the Malay hulu of distant, undefined areas far from the centre versus the "Great Wall" concept guide the perception of the South China Sea. The Nusantara concept is basically a maritime conception of free and undefined space; the Chinese appear to view the South China Sea as a bounded territory, of their exclusive sovereign territory. The two concepts of space are not compatible. As cultural concepts they are difficult to change. A modern gold miners passion for natural resources is married to ancient cultural values; a situation that has a profound impact on negotiations about the South China Sea and its resources.
Connectivity: Networks across the South China Sea
Following ideas proposed by Denis Lombard on Javanese crossroads (Le carrefour javanais) and the Asian Mediterranean (la Méditerranée Asiatique) we will have a preliminary look at what connects the countries surrounding the South China Sea. Sociologically "connectivity" is defined as the frequency of interaction between actors, in our case the ASEAN states and the East Asian states surrounding the South China Sea. By building networks the South China Sea constitutes itself as a social and cultural area. Showing increasing connectivity indicates an increasing "mediterraneanism" and a tendency to develop a mediterranean type culture, combining common features with high cultural, social and ethnic diversity.
There are many aspects of "connectivity", of which we have identified the following There is a clear boundary with no loops and deviations. Of course the hunger for energy resources, oil and gas, may be the driving force behind China's claim, but this could also be satisfied by a negotiated settlement, resulting in a patchwork of boundaries -probably a horrendous proposition to the Chinese mind and its conception of bounded space.
I am well aware that I am driving the cultural analysis perhaps too far. Not everything can be explained by cultural values, nor are cultural traits fixed in eternity. They are, however, persistent and difficult to change. It is much easier to expand the economy and drive the GDP than to change cultural values. This, at least, should be taken into account when proposing easy solutions to complex culturally determined problems.
The words of noted Malay scholar Prof B.A. Hamzah can be quoted to show the clash of cultural conceptions in regard to the South China Sea: "There are parties which have claimed almost the entire South China Sea as their own on the basis of history. Such area claims cannot be serious nor treated with much respect. In my view such area claims are as frivolous and ludicrous as the Papal Bull of 4 May 1493 dividing the world's oceans between Spain and Portugal" (Hamzah 1993:97) . This statement shows clearly the incompatibility of two different conceptions of maritime space.
The "Nusantara model" of sharing of resources, a patchwork of claims that are differentiated according the type of resource (fisheries, oil & gas, rights of passage) appears to be the best and fairest solution. Whether or not the Chinese terrestrian conception of bounded space can be changed into a maritime conception to allow a Nusantara type solution of the claims to the South China Sea may turn out to be an impossible dream, but the dream of a realm of peace, of an Asian "Maritime Darussalam" may eventually become a negotiable proposition. Baumüller, Heike; Ladenburger, Christine; von Braun, Joachim (2011) . Innovative business approaches for the reduction of extreme poverty and marginality? 81. Ziai, Aram (2011) . Some reflections on the concept of 'development'. 82. Saravanan V.S., Mollinga, Peter P. (2011) . The Environment and Human Health -An Agenda for Research. 83. Tesfai, Weyni (2011 Hornidge, Anna-Katharina (2012) . Knowledge in rural transitions -formal and informal underpinnings of land governance in Khorezm. 99. Eguavoen, Irit (2012) . Blessing and destruction. Climate change and trajectories of blame in Northern Ghana.
